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Dangerous Days: The Impact of Nationalism on Interstate Conflict 
 
 
Does an upsurge in nationalism make interstate conflict more likely? 
This article gives evidence to suggest that spikes in nationalism do 
have a direct impact on the likelihood of disputes between states. In 
it I use national days or anniversaries as occasions that increase the 
salience of the national identity and its historical wars. I show that 
in the two months following national days, conflict is markedly 
higher than would be expected; almost 30% more likely than the rest 
of the year; and particularly for states who initiate conflict or who 
have revisionist intentions. I demonstrate further how nationalist 
sentiment can increase international tensions with a case study of 
national anniversaries in China and Japan. Together this evidence 
suggests that the increase in nationalism around national days 
provides both risks and opportunities to regimes, and shapes when 
they choose conflict over cooperation in international relations. 
 
 





On the 3rd of September 2015 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched a 
nationwide celebration of the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. 
For the victory parade the CCP closed the streets of Beijing1, announced a public 
holiday and invited world leaders to Beijing for the party2. In addition to the parade of 
twelve thousand troops and sparkling new military equipment, the Chinese 
government launched a hefty propaganda campaign commemorating the war3, cleaned 
XS%HLMLQJ¶VDLU4 and pardoned jailed war veterans5. General Secretary Xi Jinping 
focused his speech on Japan, saying that the ³great triumph crushed the plot of the 
Japanese militarists to colonize and enslave China´6. A Japanese spokesman in 
UHVSRQVHFDOOHG;L¶VVSHHFKµDQWL--DSDQHVH¶7, echoing commentators¶ZDUQLQJV that 
Beijing¶Vnaked display of nationalism risked sparking tensions in an already hostile 
East Asian environment8. 
 
But what is the true impact on international relations of this kind of nationalist 
spectacle; the kind that rouses flag-waving citizens onto the streets and revives 
memories of conflicts with old enemies? And what can they tell us about the impact of 
nationalism on the likelihood of war? International relations scholars have long 
SRUWUD\HGSHRSOH¶V attachment to their nation as one of the most potent forces behind a 
VWDWH¶VGHFLVLRQWRJRWRZDU9, yet few have clearly demonstrated that it has a genuine 
                                                        
1
 ³5RDGV&ORVHG0RQNH\VRQ3DWURO$KHDGRI::,,3DUDGH´China Digital Times, September 2, 2015 
2
 ³7KHDWWHQGHHVWR&KLQD¶VPLOLWDU\SDUDGHOHDGHUVRIWKHZRUOG¶VOHDVW-SRZHUIXOFRXQWULHV´Quartz, 
August 25, 2015 
3
 ³0LQLWUXH'RQ¶W5DLQ2Q2XU0LOLWDU\3DUDGH´China Digital Times, August 24, 2015 
4
 ³%HLMLQJ6PRJ*LYHV:D\WRµ0LOLWDU\3DUDGH%OXH¶%HIRUH:RUOG:DU,,(YHQW´New York Times, 
August 25, 2015 
5
 China grants amnesty to mark anniversary of WW2 victory. Reuters, August 29, 2015  
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V::,,VSHHFK´. Channel News Asia, September 3, 2015  
8
 ³0LOLWDULVPLVD5LVN\7HPSWDWLRQIRU%HLMLQJ´Financial Times, August 31, 2015. ³China stresses 
QDWLRQDOLVPLQZDUDQQLYHUVDU\SURSDJDQGDSXVK´. Reuters, July 6, 2015 
9
 Summarised well in Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War." International 
Security 18, No.4 (1994): 5-39 
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impact on how and when conflict occurs. Attempts to give evidence for this story have 
struggled to escape the problem that government attempts to rally their population to 
support wars may be the very things that cause nationalism to rise. Annual national 
celebrations provide one plausible means of testing whether increases in nationalism 
do in fact affect the patterns of conflict between countries. 
 
This study tests the proposition that, as proxies for an increase in nationalism, national 
days lead to an increase in interstate conflict. I first examine the literature on 
nationalism before showing that these occasions bring opportunities and risks for 
leaders, which may lead to international tensions and even conflict. I argue that 
regimes can exploit the public national feeling around the days to support their 
assertive acts overseas; but that nationalist groups may also exploit this feeling to push 
regimes into unwanted confrontations. National days give leaders, every year, a choice 
over whether they should exploit or resist public nationalism, a choice which overall 
makes conflict more likely in the subsequent weeks and months. I test this argument 
by examining whether, between 1991 and 20VWDWHV¶ Militarized Interstate Disputes 
are more prevalent in the period following their main national day or anniversary. I 
show that conflicts are significantly more likely to begin in the two months following a 
national day than the rest of the year, and that this holds more strongly for the state 
that begins the dispute, and for the one looking to change the status quo. Finally I 
illustrate the mechanisms involved with a case study of war anniversaries between 
China and Japan over the last twenty years.  
 
The Impact of Nationalism on Conflict 
 
 4 
Nationalism, according to Haas, is an ideology that makes ³assertions about the 
nation's claim to historical uniqueness, to the territory that the nation-state ought to 
occupy, and to the kinds of relations that should prevail between one's nation and 
others´10. In International Relations scholarship, this ideology is one of the most 
dependable culprits for conflict between nations11, yet to date few scholars have 
isolated the variable and directly examined its impact on international behavior.   
 
Schrock-Jacobsen tests this explicitly. She shows that the greater amount of nationalist 
rhetoric a country¶V leaders use in a given year, the more likely it will go to war the 
following year12. The problem, however, is of endogeneity; nationalist rhetoric may 
have increased precisely because tensions with international opponents were already 
growing. The strength of national sentiment is likely to be dependent on the build up to 
the conflict itself, as members of the public respond to international tensions and 
attempts by their leaders to rally the population for war. As such, most attempts to 
measure the impact of increases in national sentiment by examining it directly will 
struggle to parcel out whether it has caused the build-up to a conflict or have been 
caused by that same build up. Given this problem, how can we show that waves of 
public nationalism or OHDGHUV¶nationalist rhetoric do have an impact on international 
conflict? 
 
                                                        
10
 Ernst B. Haas, "What is nationalism and why should we study it?" International Organization 40, 
no.3 (1986): 727 
11
 Van Evera (1994); 9DOHUH3*DJQRQ³Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict´International 
Security 19 No. 3 (1994), 130-%DUU\53RVHQ³Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power´
International Security 18, No. 2 (1993), 80-124 
12
 Gretchen Schrock-Jacobson, "The Violent Consequences of the Nation: Nationalism and the Initiation 
of Interstate War." Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no.5 (2012): 825-852 
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One way is to examine the occasions when there is an increase in nationalism 
independent of international tensions or the build-up to war13. 0DQVILHOGDQG6Q\GHU¶V
account is one of the few studies to succeed here, showing that appeals to nationalism 
become more prevalent at times when legitimacy is particularly important- around 
elections- and that at these times in democratizing regimes (where the appeals exert 
their greatest influence), interstate conflict becomes more likely14. Persuasive though 
the argument is, some have argued these findings do not hold using different case 
selection and statistical methods15, and it is not necessarily nationalism that is doing 
the main work: there are many developments around elections in democratizing 
regimes, including interparty violence and uncertain leadership transitions, all which 
may have impacts on conflict.  
 
An example more intuitively related to nationalism is sporting events. Andrew Bertoli 
tests the impact of attendance at the football World Cup on conflict behavior. He 
shows that those countries that narrowly gained qualification were substantially more 
likely to see interstate conflict at the time of the World Cup than those that narrowly 
missed out16. Sporting occasions are plausible outlets for nationalist sentiment, but the 
routes through which they might lead to conflict may not be generalizable. The most 
obvious path, as Bertoli notes, is where fights between fans placed in direct opposition 
to each other escalate to riots and then diplomatic fallout17- an event that is hard to 
extend to non-sporting occasions.  
                                                        
13
 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in 
qualitative research. PUP, (1994) 
14
 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War." International 
security 20, no. 1 (1995): 5-38 
15Andrew J. Enterline, ³&RUUHVSRQGHQFHRQµ'ULYLQJ:KLOH'HPRFUDWL]LQJ¶´International Security 20 
(1996): 183²196; and William R. Thompson and Richard M. Tucker, ³$7DOHRI7ZR'HPRFUDWLF
Peace &ULWLTXHV´Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1997): 428-451 
16Andrew Bertoli, "Nationalism and Interstate Conflict: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis." In APSA 
2013 Annual Meeting Paper. 2013 
17
 Bertoli (2013) 
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Even more closely linked to increases in nationalism are national days. National days 
and prominent anniversaries of independence or war celebrate not only the nation but 
in many cases also its victory (or loss) against other nations18. In this article I refer to 
national days not just as the official public-KROLGD\µ1DWLRQDO'D\V¶FHOHEUDWHGLQPDQ\
countries, but any ³GD\VLQZKLFKWKHµQDWLRQDO¶LVSDUDGHGDQGFRQVXPHG´19. They 
generally occur on the same date every year, irrespective of whether a country is in the 
build up to a conflict, and as McCrone and McPherson note, are times in which you 
³FDQ¶WHVFDSHXQOHVV\RXOHDYHWKHFRXQWU\RUVWD\LQGRRUV´20. As public displays of the 
national identity, they provide an unexplored means of measuring regular, countrywide 
increases in nationalism. The pattern of media celebration, flag waving, and marches 
also reflects a more common way by which nationalism is normally expressed than the 
intense fan-based fervor of sporting events. When national days are anniversaries of 
wars or independence, they are often militarized, with public memorials of past 
conflict and parades of arms.  
 
While the anthropological and sociological literature has discussed why states 
celebrate national days and anniversaries21, there is little systematic examination of 
their effects, either on society or state. Blake examines cultural marches, a key part of 
many anniversary celebrations. While he argues that Orange Order marches in 
Northern Ireland serve to draw a wedge between communities, he focuses his analysis 
                                                        
18
 Gabriella Elgenius, "The politics of recognition: symbols, nation building and rival 
nationalisms." Nations and Nationalism 17, no.2 (2011): 396-418 
19
 David McCrone and Gayle McPherson, eds. National Days: Constructing and Mobilizing National 
Identity. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009: 3 
20
 McCrone and McPherson (2009): 2 
21
 For example: Wendy Willems, µ=LPEDEZHZLOOQHYHUEHDFRORQ\DJDLQ¶FKDQJLQJFHOHEUDWRU\VW\OHV
and meanings of independence." Anthropology Southern Africa 36, no.1-2 (2013): 22-33 
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on why individuals join these marches in the first place22. There is some literature on 
timings of violence in civil wars around calendar events, if not on interstate violence. 
Toft & Zhukov show that Islamist violence in the Caucuses tends to follow the 
religious calendar, suggesting that this kind of violence is shaped by religious events23, 
perhaps because the festivals increase the motivation to fight, or as Hassner argues, 
provide a focal point for groups to engage in violence24.  
 
National Days, Nationalism, and Conflict 
 
I argue that national days lead to an increase in conflict between states by increasing 
the salience of the nation and its previous wars and struggles for independence. This 
leads to greater mobilisation opportunities for domestic activists and groups with a 
nationalist agenda. Hawkish leaders can take advantage of the atmosphere to gain 
support and bargaining leverage for a confrontational international stance25, while 
other decision makers, seeking to appease nationalist groups at home, may find that 
they unwillingly increase tensions abroad. 
 
Increases in nationalism 
 
Symbols of the nation that proliferate around national days- such as flags, music, and 
cultural motifs- may prime certain forms of the national identity. Schatz, Staub and 
                                                        
22
 Jonathan S. Blake, "Identity on the March: Contentious Rituals in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland." 
(2014). Unpublished Manuscript 
23
 Monica Duffy Toft and Yuri M. Zhukov, "Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and 
Counterinsurgency in Russia's North Caucasus." American Political Science Review 109, no.2 (2015): 
222-238 
24
 Ron E. Hassner, "Sacred time and conflict initiation." Security Studies 20, no.4 (2011): 491-520 
25
 A stance that puts a state into conflict with the preferences of another state 
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Lavine show that exposure to the American flag generates µEOLQGSDWULRWLVP¶26; an 
emotional identification with the nation, right-wing attitudes and rejection of national 
criticism27. Scholars have demonstrated that this exposure may make people more 
willing to favor nuclear armament28, and to be less likely to favor cooperation in 
international relations29. According to Butz, around national celebrations, ³symbols 
take on a new life and have different implications when the national climate shifts 
IURPRQHRI³EDQDOQDWLRQDOLVP´WRRQHRI³KRWQDWLRQDOLVP´DVDUHVXOWRIFRQFHUWHG
efforts to remind people of their national identity´30. At the same time, national days 
regularly feature military parades and the acting out of battles and war veteran stories 
from previous conflicts. Even on remembrance days, when these stories mourn the 
human costs of war, the memorials and marches all serve to make the image of 
military conflict extremely salient. 
 
The result is that national days increase the public salience of the national identity and 
memories of wars waged to protect that identity, as well as potentially inciting more 
hawkish foreign policy attitudes. On a prosaic level, pacifist arguments may therefore 
EHOHVVOLNHO\WRILQGFXUUHQF\LQWKHPHGLDµPDUNHWSODFHRILGHDV¶31 around national 
days, even on those days that are designed to remember the costs of war. For example 
                                                        
26
 Robert T. Schatz and Howard Lavine, "Waving the Flag: National Symbolism, Social Identity, and 
Political Engagement." Political Psychology 28, no.3 (2007): 329-355 
27
 This effect may not be unidirectional however, and others have shown that exposure to national flags 
may reduce nationalism in those who are already more nationalistic. This literature suggests that the 
impact of symbols may depend on their content (for example Ran R. Hassin, Melissa J. Ferguson, 
Daniella Shidlovski, and Tamar Gross, "Subliminal exposure to national flags affects political thought 
and behavior."Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no.50 (2007): 19757-19761; Ran 
R. Hassin, Melissa J. Ferguson, Rasha Kardosh, Shanette C. Porter, Travis J. Carter, and Veronika 
Dudareva, "Précis of implicit nationalism." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1167, no.1 
(2009): 135-145). 
28
 Seymour Feshbach, "Individual aggression, national attachment, and the search for peace: 
Psychological perspectives." Aggressive Behavior 13, no.5 (1987): 315-325 
29
 Elina Sinkkonen, "Nationalism, Patriotism and Foreign Policy Attitudes among Chinese University 
Students." The China Quarterly 216 (2013): 1045-1063 
30
 David A. Butz, "National symbols as agents of psychological and social change." Political 
Psychology 30, no.5 (2009): 779-804 
31Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine. "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas." International 
Security 21, no.2 (1996): 5-40 
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the British Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, an avowed pacifist, found himself 
subject to intense media attention around the 2015 anniversary of the end of WW1. 
Corbyn was branded in right-ZLQJPHGLDDVµGLVOR\DO¶32, while on Remembrance 
6XQGD\LWVHOIWKH&KLHIRI'HIHQFH6WDIIODXQFKHGDµVWLQJLQJDWWDFN¶RYHU&RUE\Q¶V
views on nuclear disarmament33. 
 
These changes may also give an opportunity to right-wing or nationalist activists and 
interest groups to push their own parochial agendas. 7KLVEXLOGVRII-DFN6Q\GHU¶V
argument LQµ0\WKVRI(PSLUH¶ZKHUHgroups with narrow policy interests appeal to 
national sentiment to push the case for war34. In this case however the activists and 
groups are primarily those whose ideologies and interests can best be described as 
nationalistic. On national days, the heightened national sentiment means that their 
messages will resonate more with the public. As such at these times their size and 
influence will grow, and they will be more likely to hold events or try and sway 
government policy.  
 
Nationalist groups have a variety of agendas. SRPHJURXSV¶LQWHUHVWVlie in promoting 
patriotism in their country or facing off against a major geopolitical enemy.  Polish 
nationalist groups¶ interests range from raising Polish youths in a ³Catholic and 
SDWULRWLFVSLULW´35 and fighting German claims for land in Poland36, to the threat from 





Express, November 4, 2015.  
33
 ³Jeremy Corbyn in Remembrance Sunday war with Britain's top general over nuclear button 
FRPPHQWV´The Daily Telegraph, November 8, 2015.  
34
 Jack Snyder, "Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and Strategic Ideology." Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press (1991) 
35
 Dominika Kasprowicz, ³National and Right-:LQJ5DGLFDOLVPLQWKH1HZ'HPRFUDFLHV3RODQG¶





the European Union37 and Russia38. Other nationalist groups take on an anti-American 
tone, for example in Russia the National Liberation Movement ³combines radical anti-
Americanism and anti-Semitism with Russian imperialism´39, while in Iran the 
UHJLPH¶V5HYROXWLRQDU\*XDUGVKDYHEXLOWPXFK of their legitimacy upon anti-
American sentiment40. Calls to strengthen the nation and denigrate foreign adversaries 
arise regularly on national days, not just through rhetoric in right-wing media but also 
marches and protests. Polish Independence Day regularly brings violence from 
nationalist groups, who in recent years have attacked the Russian embassy, protested 
the spread of liberal values41, and called for a stronger army42; Iranian celebrations of 
their National Day, the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, have included rallies 
against America and Israel43; while in Ukraine, anti-Russian protests arose in the 2016 
Victory Day celebrations of the end of WW244. Many of these groups have taken 
advantage of national days and anniversaries to target current international disputes or 
enemies, even if a fight against those particular enemies was not the original cause of 
the anniversary. 
 
Some nationalist groups¶ and political parties¶ interests are in a specific foreign policy 
goal. This may be in regaining disputed territories, such as Palestinian groups in Israel, 
Argentinian groups over the Falklands45, or Thai Yellow Shirts over Preah Vihear46. 




 Rafaá Pankowski, Right-Wing Extremism in Poland. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012 
39
 ³The KrHPOLQ¶VIDX[µIUHHGRPILJKWHUV¶´. Foreign Policy, April 24, 2014  
40
 ³Iran protestors hold largest anti-86UDOO\LQ\HDUV´Al-Jazeera, November 4, 2013 
41
 ³Polish Independence Day 3DUDGH7XUQV9LROHQW)RXUWK<HDU,Q$5RZ´. International Business 
Times, November 11, 2014 
42
 ³3RODQG¶V,QGHSHQGHQFH'D\0DUFK6HHV'URSLQ9LROHQFH´Radio Poland, November 12, 2015  
43
 ³,UDQLDQV&HOHEUDWHth $QQLYHUVDU\RI,VODPLF5HYROXWLRQ´Haaretz, February 11, 2016 
44
 ³1DWLRQDOLVWV'LVUXSW9LFWRU\'D\&HOHEUDWLRQVLQ8NUDLQH´Russia Today, May 9, 2016 
45
 Matthew C. Benwell and Klaus Dodds. "Argentine territorial nationalism revisited: The 




Times, April 28, 2013 
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Such groups often use national days to attempt to directly SUHVVWKHLUFRXQWU\¶VFODLP
over the territories or launch protests to their own governments to do so. For example 
in 2016 Filipino activists used their celebration of independence from Spain to protest 
Chinese actions in the South China Sea47, some attempting to plant the Philippine flag 
on the disputed islands48. TKHDQQLYHUVDU\RI,VUDHO¶VFUHDWLRQUHJXODUO\VHHV rallies in 
the Palestinian Territories49 and violent protests along ,VUDHO¶V borders with Gaza, 
Syria, and Lebanon50, while Indian and Pakistani celebrations of their independence 
from the UK often bring an upsurge in violence in Kashmir51.  
 
Other groups may have interests tied up with the influence of foreign countries or 
foreigners on the domestic front. These may include anti-immigrant political parties 
such as Front Nationale in France, as well as more extreme far-right groups. Their 
goals range from instituting policies that restrict immigration to banishing an ethnic 
group or religion from the country. The Independence Day march in 2015 in Poland 
for example took on an anti-immigrant tone, accompanied by the burning of European 
Union flags52. Finally there may be groups with particular interests in national 
historical memory, for example War Veteran organizations.  Veteran groups around 
the world demand proper memorialization of national conflicts and recognition of 
YHWHUDQV¶DFKLHYHPHQWV53, or even take on a more wide-ranging role in national 
                                                        
47
 ³$FWLYLVWV3URWHVW$JDLQVW6RXWK&KLQD6HD'LVSXWHRQ,QGHSHQGHQFH'D\´CNN, June 12, 2015 
48
 ³3KLOLSSLQH3URWHVWRUV6D\+DUDVVHGE\&KLQHVH'XULQJ)ODJ6WXQW´Channel News Asia, June 13, 
2016 
49
 ³Palestinian protests mark the anniversary of Israel's creaWLRQ´The Christian Science Monitor, May 
13, 2013 
50
 ³(LJKWVKRWGHDGRQ,VUDHOLERUGHUVDV3DOHVWLQLDQVPDUNDQQLYHUVDU\´The Independent, May 16, 2011 
³'HDGO\FODVKHVDW6\ULDQERUGHURQ0LGHDVWZDUDQQLYHUVDU\´. CNN, June 6, 2011. 
51
 ³9LROHQFH5RFNV.DVKPLU.LOOHG´ABC News, August 13, 2015 
52
 ³(8IODJEXUQHGDVWHQVRIWKRXVDQGVMRLQ:DUVDZQDWLRQDOLVWGHPR´Daily Telegraph, November 12, 
2015  
53
 $JDLQLQ)UDQFH³Veteran's anger as French bureaucracy threatens to derail 70th anniversary of D-
'D\´. The Daily Express, April 21, 2014 
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politics54. Whereas groups calling for confrontational actions over territorial disputes 
may find themselves receiving less public sympathy around painful anniversaries that 
remember casualties or losses in war, these more somber times are more likely to see 
DFWLRQVIURPµPHPRULDOL]LQJ¶JURXSV. And indeed veterans groups regularly use war 
anniversaries and independence days to launch marches or lobby for their interests55.  
 
Impact on interstate tensions 
 
These spikes in nationalist sentiment and mobilization have the potential to lead to 
increases in international tensions. Firstly, regimes may exploit and play up these 
sentiments strategically, for their own existing international goals. Given that the 
public may be more nationalistic and hawkish in their attitudes around these times, and 
nationalist groups will be more vocally pushing their agenda, leaders may see ideal 
opportunities to gain more local support for more confrontational actions.  Weiss 
argues moreover that nationalist protests - including those sparked by anniversaries - 
can help to give states bargaining leverage56. If leaders decide that the international 
advantages of gaining leverage or public support over a particular foreign policy issue 
outweigh the disadvantages, they may choose to encourage displays of nationalism. 
,QGHHGDV/HQW]VD\VQDWLRQDOGD\VDUH³VWDJHGE\WKHVWDWH´57; states can play up the 
national celebrations and flag-waving at times when international tensions are highest. 
,UDQ¶VIHUYHQWDQWL-American celebration of the 1979 US Embassy siege anniversary in 
                                                        
54
 Norma J. Kriger, Guerrilla veterans in post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and violent politics, 1980±1987. 
Vol.105. Cambridge, 2003 
55
 For example in France ³French Veterans Protest Former Nazis Laying Wreaths at Normandy 
&HPHWHULHV´JTA, May 24, 1994  
56
 Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful patriots: nationalist protest in China's foreign relations. OUP, 2014 
57
 Carola Lentz, ³&HOHEUDWLQJLQGHSHQGHQFHMXELOHHVDQGWKHPLOOHQQLXPQDWLRQDOGD\VLQ$IULFD´
Nations and Nationalism, 19, no.1 (2013): 208 - 216 
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2010 for example occurred right before confrontational US-Iran nuclear talks58. This 
was in contrast to the muted 2014 protest, again just prior to bilateral nuclear meetings, 
the difference this time being that the Rohani government was pushing a more 
conciliatory policy in the talks59. On one hand then, national days provide an 
opportunity for states in the international arena. If leaders are considering invading a 
neighbor or testing a missile, the potential increase in public nationalism may make 
them more likely to choose to do so around national days, giving them greater 
domestic support and international leverage.  
 
Leaders may also respond directly to nationalist sentiment around national days. One 
common response is to mark WKHGD\ZLWKV\PEROLFGLVSOD\VRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VVWUHQJWK
These displays might not just be large-scale military rallies - but also international 
actions that send a message both at home and abroad that the country will stand up for 
itself. Kim, Kang, and Lee find for example that North Korean nuclear tests have been 
PRUHOLNHO\WRRFFXUDURXQGELUWKGD\VRIWKHµ'HDU/HDGHUV¶60; arguably an attempt to 
boost the prestige of their leader with a display of military might. As part of its 
Independence Day celebrations in 2016, in the midst of the South China Sea dispute, 
the Indonesia regime scuttled ships from Vietnam and China. According to former 
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, this was an explicit signal to other claimants that 
Indonesia would firmly protect its maritime territory61. 
 
                                                        
58
 ³,UDQVWDJHVPDVVSURWHVWRQDQQLYHUVDU\RI86HPEDVV\FDSWXUH´. The Daily Telegraph, November 4, 
2010.  
59
 ³,UDQLDQV0DUNWK$QQLYHUVDU\RI86(PEDVV\7DNHRYHULQ7HKUDQ´Haaretz, November 4, 
2013.  
60
 Han Y. Kim, Hyoung G. KangDQG-RQJ./HH³Can Big Data Forecast North Korean Military 
$JJUHVVLRQ"´Working paper 
61
 ³,QGLDWR6LQN)RUHLJQ)LVKLQJ%RDWV$PLG6RXWK&KLQD6HD7HQLRQ´Bloomberg, August 15, 
2016 
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While it is likely that North Korea and Indonesia would likely have taken these 
confrontational actions at some point anyway, leaders often appear particularly keen to 
make reference to international disputes on national days. This is especially the case 
for disputed territories, which form a central part of the idea of national unity 
promoted on the days; whether it be the Pakistan High Commissioner to India 
announcing WKDW³3DNLVWDQZLOOQHYHUDEDQGRQ.DVKPLULV´62 or Tanzanian leader 
.LNZHWHZDUQLQJ0DODZLQRWWR³WU\DQGWDNHDZD\RXUWHUULWRU\´63, as part of their 
respective independence celebrations. 
 
Indeed for some leaders national days may provide more of a risk than an opportunity, 
as the increase in nationalism and mobilization of nationalist groups puts pressure on 
them to take actions that might increase international tensions against their wishes. 
Some may have domestic political reasons to pander to nationalist sentiment, and 
cannot afford to ignore accusations of acting unpatriotically. For leaders who are 
particularly sensitive to media reactions64, the silencing of pacifist voices and 
amplifying of nationalist voices around national days may lead them to give in to the 
media clamor and adopt more hawkish policies. Other leaders may be beholden to the 
nationalist political lobby groups who push their agenda around these times, especially 
if such groups form their base of support, as is the case for Narendra Modi in India for 
example65. These leaders may feel under pressure to mark national days with a 
concession to those groups, such as referencing a territorial dispute in a 
commemorative speech. Finally, for leaders more concerned about keeping public 
order, public demonstrations may push policy in a more escalatory direction. Ciorciari 
                                                        
62
 ³3DNLVWDQHQYR\UDLVHV.DVKPLULQ,QGHSHQGHQFH'D\VSHHFK´. The Hindu, August 14, 2015  
63
 ³7DQ]DQLD5DLVHV6WDNHVLQ%RUGHU&ODVKZLWK0DODZL´Voice of America, July 25, 2013  
64
 Fay Lomax Cook, Tom R. Tyler, Edward G. Goetz, Margaret T. Gordon, David Protess, Donna R. 
Leff, and Harvey L. Molotch. "Media and agenda setting: Effects on the public, interest group leaders, 
policy makers, and policy." Public Opinion Quarterly 47, no.1 (1983): 16-35 
65
 ³7KH+LQGX+DUGOLQH566ZKRVHH0RGLDVWKHLURZQ´BBC Online, Oxtober 22, 2014  
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and Weiss argue that in some cases nationalist protests will be costly to repress, and 
governments may need to give in to the demands of protestors, which again may 
include inflammatory speeches or more confrontational stances on territorial disputes66.  
 
Pressure from nationalist groups may also result in actions that provoke a militarized 
response from another state. Some actions, such as attacks across borders, may 
themselves be acts of interstate conflict. These attacks or µIODJSODQWLQJ¶visits to 
disputed areas can bring harsh diplomatic criticism, return visits, or even direct 
violence on the visitors67 from other claimant states. Groups who insult foreign 
countries, or launch attacks on embassies or on foreign citizens in nationalist riots may 
also spark demands for apologies68 or even reciprocal attacks from opposing publics.  
 
While each of these incidents alone may not be enough to spark conflict, they put 
pressure on leaders to issue some kind of response. This may heighten interstate 
tensions, make cooperation less likely and increase the risk of conflict. An example of 
this kind of action-reaction spiral came between Pakistan and its neighbors in August 
2016. When Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif dedicated his speech on the 70th 
DQQLYHUVDU\RI3DNLVWDQLLQGHSHQGHQFHWRWKH³IUHHGRPRI.DVKPLU´IURP,QGLDQUXOH69, 
RQ,QGLD¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHFHOHEUDWLRQVWKHYHU\QH[WGD\,QGLDQ3ULPH0LQLVWHU
Narendra Modi hit back by criticizing Pakistani government operations against 
terrorist groups in Baluchistan province70. His comments drew demonstrations in the 
province, which borders Afghanistan, protestors taking to the streets and burning the 
                                                        
66
 John D. Ciorciari, and Jessica Chen Weiss  ³Nationalist Protests, Government Responses, and the 
5LVNRI(VFDODWLRQLQ,QWHUVWDWH'LVSXWHV´ Security Studies 25, no.4 (2016)  
67
 Ron E. Hassner, ³7RKDOYHDQGWRKROG´&RQIOLFWVRYHUVDFUHGVSDFHDQGWKHSUREOHPRI
indivisibility." Security Studies 12, no.4 (2003): 1-33 
68
 ³8NUDLQHFULVLV5XVVLDFRQGHPQVDWWDFNRQ.LHYHPEDVV\´BBC News, June 14, 2014 
69
 ³,QGLDQ300RGL¶V%DORFKLVWDQ&RPPHQWV8SVHW3DNLVWDQ´Deutsche Welle, August 15, 2016  
70
 ³,QGLDQ301DUHQGUD0RGLVD\V&RXQWU\ZLOOµ1HYHU%HQG%HIRUH7HUURULVP¶LQ$GGUHVVWR1DWLRQ´
IB Times, August 15, 2016 
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Indian flag71. The WHQVLRQVHVFDODWHGIXUWKHUIRU3DNLVWDQRQ$IJKDQLVWDQ¶V
Independence Day four days later, when Afghan demonstrators themselves angry 
about the Pakistani protests stormed the Bab e-Dosti µIULHQGVKLS¶border gate and set 
fire to the Pakistani flag72. This rally brought an angry diplomatic protest from 
Pakistan, and in retaliation government officials closed the gate for almost two weeks, 
only reopening after a written apology from their Afghan counterparts73. In those 
weeks trade was suspended across the border, badly affecting bilateral economic 
relations74, and Kabul expelled 250 Pakistani workers amidst the tensions75. 
 
An angry reaction to provocation may be especially likely when the current 
geopolitical opponent is also the historical enemy in a conflict memorialized by an 
anniversary. At these times citizens and leaders may be even more likely to see 
memorializing acts by its enemy as a deliberate insult or provocation, giving 
opportunities for nationalist groups in that country to mobilize in response. While 
remembrance days arouse memories of the costs of going to war, they also bring up 
the enormous sacrifices made to protect the country  - and any weakness in the face of 
confrontation by the same enemy risks being seen as a betrayal of those sacrifices. 
This puts leaders under particular pressure to respond. In 2015 for example Croatia 
FHOHEUDWHGµ9LFWRU\'D\¶WKH twentieth anniversary of Operation Storm, a Croatian 
military victory over Serbian rebels in 1995. The festivities escalated to the extent that 
the two countries exchanged diplomatic protest notes, the Serbians accusing Croatian 
RIILFLDOVRILVVXLQJ³DFDOOWRDWWDFNDQGGHVWUR\6HUEV´2QWKH&URDWLDQVLGH
                                                        
71
 ³,QGLDQ)ODJV6HW$EOD]HLQ%DORFKLVWDQ)ROORZLQJ1DUHQGUD0RGL¶V,-'D\'LDWULEHDJDLQVW3DNLVWDQ´
IB Times, August 19, 2016  
72
 ³3DNLVWDQ-$IJKDQLVWDQ%RUGHU5HPDLQV&ORVHGIRU)RXUWK'D\´Fox News, August 22, 2016  
73
 $FFRUGLQJWR3DNLVWDQLQHZVSDSHUV³Pakistan to reopen Chaman border tomorrow after Afghanistan 
tenders written apology´ The News International, August 31, 2016) 
74
 ³Traffic Across Afghanistan-3DNLVWDQ%RUGHUWR5HVXPH7KXUVGD\´VoA, August 31, 2016 
75
 ³$IJKDQLVWDQGHSRUWV3DNLVWDQLVGXHWRERUGHUWHQVLRQ´The Times of India, August 28, 2016 
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nationalist parades and concerts led to mass anti-Serbian chanting, while in Serbia 
nationalist leaders and accused war criminals burned Croatian flags in front of its 
embassy and the Serbian President, in a commemorative speech, harshly criticized 
Croatian behavior in the war76.  Yet geopolitics can take over at these times even 
between states that were not on opposing sides of a war anniversary. In 2015 for 
example, in the midst of a dispute over Russian actions in Ukraine, Russian officials 
FDOOHG(XURSHDQOHDGHUV¶ER\FRWWRILWV::,,9LFWRU\'D\SDUDGHDQµLQVXOW¶WRWKH
memory of Allied soldiers77, while the following year tensions between Russia and the 
US spilled into Moldova, when Moldovan leaders cancelled a Victory Day display of 
American weaponry in the face of pressure from pro-Russian organizations78. 
 
Facing up to national days  
 
While the heightened national sentiment and pressure from nationalist groups around 
national days might provide opportunities for hawkish leaders, they may become risks 
when states are looking to pursue more cooperative policies. At these times many 
states cannot fully manipulate the national sentiment and actions of their citizens and 
pressure groups. Even when the Iranian regime chose to play down anniversary 
protests in 2014, thousands of Iranians turned up on the streets chanting anti-American 
slogans79, while Israeli soldiers have been unable to prevent violence from spilling 
DFURVVERUGHUVRQWKHFRXQWU\¶Vindependence day80. One problem is that national days 
and anniversaries are often quite deliberately embedded into the national 
                                                        
76
 ³6HUELD&URDWLDLQ'LSORPDWLF5RZ2YHU2SHUDWLRQ6WRUP´Balkan Insight, August 7, 2015.  
77
 ³/HDGHUV¶6QXERI0RVFRZ9LFWRU\3DUDGHµ,QVXOWWR6ROGLHUV¶6D\V5XVVLD´The Telegraph, March 
23, 2015 
78
 ³86-5XVVLD7HQVLRQ6SLOOVRYHULQWR0ROGRYD¶V9LFWRU\'D\´Eurasianet, May 10, 2016  
79
 ³Flag-EXUQLQJ,UDQLDQVPDUNWKDQQLYHUVDU\RI86(PEDVV\WDNHRYHU´Los Angeles Times, 
September 7, 2015.  
80
 ³(LJKWVKRWGHDGRQ,VUDHOLERUGHUVDV3DOHVWLQLDQVPDUNDQQLYHUVDU\´The Independent, May 6, 2011  
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consciousness over many decadHVDQGHYHQRQµTXLHW¶\HDUVLQHYLWDEO\GUDZ
celebrations. Regimes can attempt to play down festivities or clamp down upon 
nationalist sentiment, but this does not stop public awareness of the significance of the 
dates, particularly in less authoritarian states, where leaders can less easily control 
public opinion. The historical significance of the dates also means that for those 
regimes who rely on patriotism for their legitimacy, it is often difficult to discourage 
citizens from celebrating or launching WKHLURZQµSDWULRWLF¶SURWHVWV 
 
Even if regimes are able to exert control over the attitudes or behaviors of their 
populace around these times, national days are something that they need to deal with in 
one form or another. Leaders anticipate the rise in nationalism and the potential for 
mobilization (which exists even if they take no actions), and can then choose to 
encourage, repress, ignore, or give concessions, depending on their domestic and 
foreign goals. If the country is climbing the mountain of conflict, then anniversaries 
can help to smooth the way, providing much needed public support. However if 
regimes are unable to control the rise in national sentiment, or feel the need to make 
concessions to their electoral base or to nationalist protestors, then international 
tensions may rise, even if they are looking to maintain a benign international 
atmosphere. 
 
Either way, national celebrations are something that leaders have to face up to every 
year, events that provide them with either an opportunity or a risk, by making them 
confront potential rises in public nationalism and decide how to respond. This is not a 
choice they necessarily have to make on other dates, and overall I hypothesize that it 
makes conflict more likely. Nationalist rhetoric often begins in the weeks before a 
national day, so we might expect a leap in conflict propensity in the lead-up. However, 
 19 
given that the bottom-up mechanisms discussed in the theory may take time to develop 
from heightened nationalism to international use of force, with an action-reaction 
spiral of provocation and reaction, I hypothesize that tensions that build around the day 
will take a few weeks or even months to develop into a full-blown militarized dispute.  
 
- Hypothesis 1: Interstate conflict is more likely in the period following national 
days than at other times in the year 
 
My theory implies two further hypotheses. Firstly, as discussed, nationalistic 
provocations might incite confrontation from another state and spark a spiral of 
provocation and reaction on both sides. However in its simplest incarnation, the theory 
explains how states should resort to the use of force following their own national day, 
in response to nationalist sentiment or action by nationalist groups. Therefore the 
nationalism from national days should have more of an impact on the state that 
initiates a conflict than a state that responds to a conflict. Secondly, we would expect 
the increase in nationalism to lead to conflict more in revisionist states - states looking 
to change the international status quo - where leaders will be more willing to take the 
international risks that come from allowing nationalism to run wild. Nationalist 
passions are also more likely to take hold in populations who feel there is an 
international injustice that they are looking to change.  
 
- H2: The increased likelihood of interstate conflict after national days will be 
more likely to apply to states who initiate conflicts 
 
- H3: The increased likelihood of interstate conflict after national days will be 




An alternative possibility is that national days dampen the likelihood of conflict. As 
discussed, some anniversaries may bring out negative memories of war and the 
violence it brings, and therefore reduce public support for military action around these 
times, leading to less conflict. Moreover, national days may not just provide 
opportunities for states to take more confrontational stances against their opponents, 
but also provide ideal occasions through which leaders can attempt to mend bilateral 
relations)RUH[DPSOH7XUNLVK3UHVLGHQW5HFHS(UGRJDQXVHG5XVVLD¶V9LFWRU\
Day celebrations to write to Vladimir Putin, offering his wishes for an improvement in 
relations between the two countries, the first contact between the leaders since the 
Turkish air force shot down a Russian plane seven months earlier81. Finally, if leaders 
are aware of the risks national days pose, then they might be particularly careful 
around the celebrations of their rivals, aware that any incident might be more likely to 
provoke a reaction at these times than otherwise. If these factors hold, we might expect 
to see fewer conflicts around national days.  
 
Another alternative is that the days make internal unrest more likely, and it is this that 
leads to more interstate conflict (for example through the diversionary theory of 
war82). National days are often public holidays, and groups often choose these holidays 
for anti-government protests (for example JOREDO0D\'D\SURWHVWVIRUZRUNHUV¶ULJKWV
in 201683), or even use the occasion WRDSSHDUPRUHµSDWULRWLF¶LQWKHLUSURWHVWVRU
violence. Unrest may be especially likely in countries where the day celebrates 
secession from a neighboring country, and therefore draws protests from the 
                                                        
81
 ³7XUNLVK303UHVLGHQW&RQJUDWXODWH5XVVLDQ&RXQWHUSDUWVIRU1DWLRQDO'D\´Hurriyet Daily News, 
June 14, 2016 
82
 Jack S. Levy, "Domestic politics and war." Journal of Interdisciplinary History (1988): 653-673 
83
 ³0D\'D\3URWHVWV,Q6HDWWOH3DULV,VWDQEXO(UXSW,Q9LROHQFH´Huffington Post, May 2, 2016  
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QHLJKERU¶V ethnic kin84. I test this in a number of ways in my robustness checks. To 
test whether there is anything VSHFLDODERXWWKHµQDWLRQDO¶FRQWHQWRIQDWLRQDOdays I 
also examine the impact of non-national public holidays on conflict. I also test whether 
national days increase the likelihood of domestic political violence, and whether the 
link between national days and conflict holds if states born out of secession with their 




I first test these hypotheses by examining whether, cross-nationally, conflict is more 
likely to begin in the time following DFRXQWU\¶VQDWional day than otherwise.  
 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
I measure conflict by the number of Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) onsets in a 
given month between 1992 and 201085. Most of the former Soviet states had gained 
their independence by this time; as such national days have stayed reasonably constant 
within this period. The MID measure is not perfect in many ways, but serves as a 
reasonable proxy for DVWDWH¶VFRQIOLFWbehavior. 
 
My independent variable is the number of months following a national day. I create a 
database of one primary national day per country86. To be chosen as such the day 
needed to include widespread public use of national symbols and references to the 
                                                        
84
 With thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion  
85
 Using the MID database from: http://www.correlatesofwar.org 
86
 Using one main day has two advantages. The first is that in some places there are a large number of 
days that could potentially be celebrated as national occasions by someone in the population, given the 
number of past conflicts in some countries. Using only one per country gives a clear and conservative 
standard for inclusion. It also allows for a more precise and parsimonious statistical test; each MID will 
have only one day over the previous year 
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nation. For most countries this is easy to code, as the country has one clear national 
day that is also its official National Day (for example independence days across Africa 
and Eastern Europe). In other countries the classification was more difficult, with two 
or three contenders; and I used media reports and secondary literature to determine the 
primary national day87. In my robustness checks I only test for those countries with 
one primary national day, with similar results.  
 
Statistical model 
I use a logistic regression with fixed effects, since my dependent variable is the binary 
occurrence (or not) of the onset of a MID in the days following a national day in a 
given country. Against this I regress various intervals following national days every 
year. I use intervals of thirty, sixty and ninety days. My expectation is that the impact 
of national days will be strongest in the first month, but given the chain of action and 
reaction I describe above, it may be that the actual impact on conflict takes longer to 
settle in. While I use fixed effects in my model, for easier interpretation and robustness 
I also use a logistic model with country dummies, with standard errors clustered by 
country. Given the relative low number of MIDs in my dataset, in my robustness 
checks I also carry out a rare events logistic regression. Finally, to examine how 
disputes play out over the whole year following national days, I created twelve 
weighted months, and carried out similar regressions.  I test the relationship for the 
subset of µLQLWLDWRUV¶, the country coded as taking the first militarized action in the MID 




most widely celebrated in the media may not be the one that brings up the most nationalist sentiment); 
but should have no systematic bias and if anything should underestimate the strength of my results. I 
also remove from the dataset MIDs involving large multilateral efforts that might unfairly bias the 
results - but where most of the participants were not the original belligerents. On occasions where start 
dates in the month were unknown I took a start point of the 15th 
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P\+DQGIRUµUHYLVLRQLVW¶VWDWHVWKRVHFRXQWULHVZKRDUHUHYLVLRQLVWRUVHHNLQJWR
change the status quo in any MID (my H3).  
 
Controls 
The regression is clean, since there are few variables that could plausibly influence 
both the timing of a national day and the timing of a conflict. I include one control, the 
time of year, since it is possible that both conflicts and national days are more likely in 
one season. Studies have suggested that higher temperatures increase the likelihood of 
conflict88, which might therefore rise over the summer, while governments may also 
choose summertime for a national celebration. The below graph casts doubt on this 
correlation, but I include the control to be safe. In robustness checks I split time of the 
year by hemisphere, since summer in the north will be winter in the south.  
 
Figure 1: Proportion of National Days and MIDs, by Month 1992 - 2010 
 
This gives the following equation: 
 
 





                                                        
88
 Marshall B. Burke, Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, John A. Dykema, and David B. Lobell. 
"Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa. "Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 106, no.49 (2009): 20670-20674 
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The results suggest that conflict is more likely in the thirty and sixty days following 
national days (Table 1). Figure 2 shows the spread of conflict by month. From the 
model the odds ratio of conflict in the first thirty days following an anniversary against 
other times is 1.25:1, and 1.27:1 for the first sixty days (significant at p<0.05 and 
p<0.01). After ninety days this increase is only minimally significant. The logistic 
model without fixed effects gives similar results89. The predicted probabilities from 
this model suggest that for all states, in the first thirty days conflicts are 27.1% more 
likely than the rest of the year and 27.8% more likely over the first sixty days90. Over 
sixty days this works out to around 0.174 more disputes per country against other 
times of the year (an average of 0.815 disputes over the first sixty days versus 0.641 
disputes per-sixty day period for the rest of the year).  
 
Table 1: Log Odds of Conflict in Days Following National Days against Rest of 
the Year 










    
30 days 0.225**  
 (0.0900)   
60 days  0.238***  
  (0.0690)  






Month -0.0360*** -0.0375*** -0.039*** 
 (0.00791) (0.00795) (0.00799) 
N 1,026,591 1,026,591 1,026,591 
    
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                        
89
 The rare events logit gives even stronger results, with the log odds for thirty, sixty and ninety days at 
0.245 (p<0.01), 0.248(p<0.01), and 0.116 (p<0.1) respectively (appendix table 9). The results do not 
change when using time-of-year split by hemisphere as a control (appendix table 6) 
90
 The predicted probabilities are similar when using an OLS regression with fixed effects: an increase 
of 29.8% over the first thirty days and 27.3% over the first sixty days (appendix table 14) 
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Figure 2: Probability of Militarized Interstate Dispute by month following National Day 
 
Figure 3: Probability of Militarized Interstate Dispute by month following National Day 
in revisionist state 
 
My results show that these findings mainly hold for initiating and revisionist states. 
The odds ratio of conflict in the first thirty and sixty days after a national day is 1.35:1 
and 1.32:1 for initiating states and 1.37:1 and 1.49:1 for revisionist states respectively 
(tables 2 and 3); the effect also lasts longer in revisionist states, remaining significant 
over ninety days, see Figure 3). The simple logit model suggests that this means 
conflicts are 37.6% more likely in the first thirty days and 34.3% more likely in the 
first sixty days for states that initiate conflicts than the rest of the year, and 39.3% and 
49.9% more likely respectively for revisionist states. Notably, the results are 
insignificant for those states that do not initiate the conflicts, and/or are not 
revisionist91.  
 
Table 2: Log Odds of Conflict in Days Following National Days against Rest of the Year: 
Initiating State92 









State - 60 
days 
Initiating 












State - 90 
days 
      
30 days 0.299***   0.119   
 (0.121)   (0.135)   
60 days  0.281***   0.162  
  (0.0944)   (0.101)  
90 days 
  
0.140   0.0645 
 
  
(0.0863)   (0.0913) 
 
      
Month -0.0495*** -0.0510*** -0.0504*** -0.0210* -0.0224* -0.0216* 
                                                        
91
 See appendix table 12 and 13. Rare events logits support these findings (appendix table 9). The 
predicted probabilities are slightly lower when using an OLS regression with fixed effects: for the 
initiating state 34.5% higher over the first thirty days and 32.5% over the first sixty; for revisionist states 
37.6% higher over thirty, 49.8% higher over sixty (appendix table 14) 
92
 No significant differences in coefficients between initiators and non-initiators  
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 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
N 963,728 963,728 963,728 927,684 927,684 927,684 
       
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 3: Log Odds of Conflict in Days Following National Days against Rest of the Year: 
Revisionist State93 


















      
30 days 0.316**   0.145   
 (0.135)   (0.121)   
60 days  0.399***   0.106  
  (0.103)   (0.0933)  
90 days 
  0.243**   0.0087 
 
  (0.0955)   (0.0834) 
 
      
Month -0.0350*** -0.0387*** -0.0387*** -0.0361*** -0.0364*** -0.0355*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
N 825,232 825,232 825,232 993,130 993,130 993,130 
       
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Robustness 
Firstly I test whether these results only hold for countries with one primary National 
Day. The results for the logistic model with fixed effects are if anything slightly 
higher, with odds ratios for all states of 1.37:1 for thirty days (p<0.01), 1.31:1 for sixty 
days (p<0.01) and 1.19:1 over ninety days (p<0.05). I also show that the result holds 
only in this two-month period, and is not just an artifact of the data. The odds ratios 
over each two-month period following a national day demonstrates that the only 
significant increase in odds comes between the month before the national day and the 
month after, and the only significant drop comes between the second and third month. 
                                                        
93
 The coefficients are significantly different between revisionist and non-revisionist in 60 and 90 days 
(p<0.05 and p<0.1) 
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There is also no significant increase when testing the impact of the eighth month 
directly on MID propensity (the other apparent spike in Figure 2)94. 
 
Table 4: Odds for Rise/Drop in MIDs Between-Months Following National Day95 
Month 
change 












p-value 0.06 0.75 0.02 0.33 0.69 0.90 0.73 0.33 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.13 
 
To further substantiate my results and test whether this may just be a result of protests 
on public holidays I examine the impact of non-national, non-symbolic, and secular 
public holidays. I again choose one for each country, varying between days like May 
Day, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO:RPHQ¶V'D\and YDULRXV1HZ<HDU¶V'D\V. Periods following 
these holidays show no significant increase in conflict, even for revisionist states96. 
National days also have no effect on the likelihood of internal armed conflict97 or 
major episodes of political violence98, and the overall positive results still hold when 
we exclude country-years with ongoing internal conflict99. The results also hold when 
ZHH[FOXGHµVHFHVVLRQLVW¶VWDWHV100. While the results do not account for all instances of 
domestic unrest, these tests suggest that domestic factors are not the main drivers of 
the national day effect. 
 
The theory that international belligerence is not only driven by top-down manipulation 
but also bottom-up pressure might be less plausible if the national day-increase in 
MIDs is seen only in authoritarian states. In these regimes leaders have greater ability 
                                                        
94
 See appendix table 26 
95
 Using a non-fixed effects logit 
96
 See appendix table 17 
97
 UCDP database of internal armed conflicts (Therése Pettersson DQG3HWHU:DOOHQVWHHQ³Armed 
Conflicts, 1946-2014´. Journal of Peace Research 52, no.4, 2015. See appendix table 25 
98
 &HQWHUIRU6\VWHPLF3HDFHRQ³LQGHSHQGHQFHLQWHUVWDWHHWKQLFDQGFLYLOYLROHQFHDQGZDUIDUH´ 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. See appendix table 24 
99
 See appendix table 26 
100
 See appendix table 27 
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to manipulate the importance of a celebration, and less incentive to pander to pressure 
groups or public opinion. Testing by regime type101 shows however that while 
established autocracies do show some minimally significant increases over sixty days 
(odds ratio of 1.30:1, but non-significant over thirty days), it is only in established 
democracies that national days appear to have a consistently strong effect on conflict 
propensity (1.38:1 over thirty days and 1.32:1 over sixty days). Results are non-
significant for hybrid regimes102. 
 
,DOVRWHVWIRUWKHUREXVWQHVVRIWKHµ5HYLVLRQLVW¶PHDVXUHE\ORRNLQJDWDQRWKHU
plausible PHDVXUHRIDFRXQWU\¶V concerns about the status quo, military expenditure. 
National days only have a significant impact on the likelihood of conflict in those 
countries where military expenditure is above the mean (odds ratio of 1.31:1 over the 
first sixty days (p<0.01), versus a non-significant 1.17:1 when below)103. The conflicts 
that occur in the sixty days following a national day also see a small but significantly 
greater level of fatalities (around 0.092 higher on a 0-6 scale, p<0.05) and hostility 
level (around 0.152 higher, on a 1-5 scale, p<0.05)104.  
 
We might expect that not only will national days increase the likelihood of conflict 
ZLWKDQ\FRXQWU\EXWWKDWWKLVHIIHFWZLOOEHSDUWLFXODUO\ODUJHIRUµG\DGLF¶days, when 
the current opponent was also the opponent in the war anniversary. Unfortunately this 
effect is difficult to test using the national days used in this data, which mainly 
celebrate independence from a distant colonial power, rather than anniversaries of war 
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against a current enemy. As such105 the number of conflicts in total that states have 
DJDLQVWWKHµWDUJHW¶RIWKHQDWLRQDOGD\DUHYHU\IHZRQO\, or 0.025 of the MIDs). 
These are not significantly more likely to occur in the first two months, as we might 
expect given the small sample size. I explore the peculiar danger of dyadic days in the 
case study below. 
 
Discussion 
The results show that there is a clear increase in the propensity of interstate conflict 
following national days. As figures 2 shows, there is a (albeit non-significant) jump in 
the month leading up the day, before conflict peaks in the next month. This suggests 
that the likelihood of a dispute builds up in the weeks before the celebration but does 
not fully emerge until the next two months. Militarized disputes are almost 30% more 
likely at these times, an effect similar to the jump in conflict propensity we would 
expect from an autocratic regime change106. This is especially clear for states with 
revisionist intent (or high military spending), who show as much as a 45% greater 
likelihood of conflict in the first two months after a national day against the rest of the 
year. The finding suggests that national days have a particular effect on conflict in 
states not happy with the status quo. This is consistent both with the argument that 
greater nationalist sentiment, feelings of injustice and the need to regain lost territories 
push states towards more conflict in this period, and also that more belligerent states 
will be more likely to take advantage of the celebration to signal their resolve.   
 
The fact that we see no impact of non-national holidays on the likelihood of conflict 
indicates that there is something special about national festivals that encourages 
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interstate violence, and that this effect does not appear to be driven by greater domestic 
armed conflict. Conflicts that occur in the first two months are more violent than at 
other times, which suggests moreover that not only does nationalism incite more 
conflict, but also that conflict linked to these sentiments may provoke a different type 
of violence to other times. Finally, the fact that the national day effect is not limited to 
autocracies, and indeed is stronger in institutionalized democracies, with less 
centralized control over the media and more electoral pressures, suggests that the 
national day effect is likely to be driven to some extent from below, from public 
opinion or nationalist interest groups.  
 
National Anniversaries in Japan and China 
 
The run of war anniversaries in Japan and China provides an excellent case in which to 
analyze the mechanisms of the theory, and also the alternative argument that somber 
anniversaries might lead to a dampening of international tensions. It is also a case, 
where, at least for China, scholars have explicitly argued that the regime is 
manipulating public nationalism for its own international purposes107, and is therefore 
a challenging case to show that these days also have a bottom-up impact. The war 
anniversaries discussed are dyadic - in that the original opponents of the anniversary 
(Japan and China) are also current geopolitical opponents - so goes beyond the 
intricacies possible in the cross-national test above, which looks only at how national 
days affect the likelihood of conflict against any opponent. A dyadic case like this 
gives some insight on how national days may be particularly dangerous when current 
geopolitical rivals are also historical rivals. However as this case will show, the 
mechanisms involved are the same, whether they are rivals or not. National days lead 
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to an increase in salience of the nation and its past conflicts, which increase pressure 
on the government to take confrontational actions. If leaders choose to encourage and 
coopt this pressure, or make concessions, then international tensions increase.  
 
It is hard to show the counterfactual; that tensions would not have increased without 
the anniversaries; and it is plausible that the disputes discussed would have taken place 
in some form nonetheless. It is also worth noting that despite tensions between China 
and Japan, there have been very few serious military incidents between the two 
countries since WWII. So while national occasions have contributed towards an 
increase in tensions in the region, the case shows that spikes in nationalism are not an 
automatic recipe for war, since even with these disputes there have been enough 
countervailing factors to prevent them from breaking out into open conflict.   
 
I focus on three painful national days in successive summer months, 7th July (the 
anniversary of the µ0DUFR3ROR Bridge¶LQFLGHQWWKH1937 Japan invasion of China), 
15th $XJXVWDQQLYHUVDU\RI-DSDQ¶VVXUUHQGHUWR$OOLHGIRUFHVDQGnot least the 
XQRIILFLDOµ1DWLRQDO+XPLOLDWLRQ'D\¶RQ18th September (anniversary of the Mukden 
Incident, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931)108. The Marco Polo Bridge and 
Mukden incident are particularly significant in China, and featured extensively in 
history textbooks since the 1990s. Marco Polo Bridge remembrance ceremonies are 
held in Beijing and covered in front-page news109, while on the Mukden anniversary 
sirens are sounded across cities in China at 10am110. The 15th August is 
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commemorated more widely in Japan, with highly publicized annual memorial 
services111.  
 
As we might expect, media references to painful national historical events increase 
around the anniversaries. Figure 4 shows the average monthly references in the 
Chinese state newspaper the 3HRSOH¶V'DLO\ to the µ1DQMLQJ0DVVDFUH¶ and µ0DUFR
Polo %ULGJH,QFLGHQW¶ The references are notably higher around national anniversaries, 
even away from the specific anniversaries of the incidents in early July and mid-
December.  
 
Figure 4:  Mentions of Past Japanese Violence in the People's Daily by Month, 
1980 - 2011 
 
 
It is not just memorials of painful events. On the 70th anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War in Asia, the landscape in China was saturated with images of 
conflict with Japan. The government required Chinese national flags to be hung around 
WKHVWUHHWVLQ%HLMLQJWR³further enhance the celebrations´112, and the parade featured 
an enormous show of military might113. There was little doubt as to the target in the 
µCommemoration of the 70th Anniversary of Victory of Chinese People's Resistance 
Against Japanese Aggression and World Anti-Fascist War¶114. The airwaves were at 
times literally filled with memories of fighting the Japanese. In the lead-up the 
government produced ³10 movies, 12 TV series, 20 documentaries and three cartoon 
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series´ about the Japanese invasion115. And over the week of the anniversary, &KLQD¶V
top television channels suspended all entertainment shows, replacing them with 
programs about the war116.  
 
Chinese media is more likely to refer to Japan as an enemy around anniversaries117, as 
well as the US, a geopolitical opponent but not the target of the anniversary (figure 
5)118. The media also discusses territorial disputes more around national anniversaries, 
as shown in Figure 6, especially the disputed Diaoyu/Senkakus islands (the use of 
µ'LDR\X¶ ZLWKµ-DSDQ¶ in the 3HRSOH¶V'DLO\ is significantly higher after 
anniversaries119, while PHQWLRQVRIµ3KLOLSSLQHV¶ LQWKHGLVSXWHGµ6RXWK&KLQD6HD¶ 
also rose very slightly120).  
 
Figure 5:  Mentions of Threat from Geopolitical Opponent in People's Daily by 
Month, 1980 - 2011 
 
 
Figure 6: Average Mentions of ''Diaoyu' and 'Japan'' and ''South China Sea' and 
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One prominent example of how nationalist activists have used anniversaries to push 
for actions that have then sparked bilateral tensions is visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In 
1978 Japanese priests interred the souls of fourteen Class A war criminals in the shrine, 
and visits from Japanese leaders on the 15th August anniversary of the end of WW2 
have since become a controversial issue amongst nationalist and liberal Japanese 
groups, as well as for China and Korea. Daiki argues that rightist intellectuals, 
politicians and activists in Japan see the visits as central to a patriotic memory they 
wish to preserve, and together form influential pressure groups121. Every year in the 
build up to the anniversary Japanese lobby groups and conservative newspapers 
pressurize politicians to commemorate the anniversary by carrying out an official visit 
and offering. The Japan Association for Bereaved Families (JABF) for example, a 
group set up to support families of deceased WW2 soldiers, with an estimated 
membership of around one million, use demonstrations, petitions and informal 
lobbying in their goal to persuade Prime Ministers to visit the shrine on the 
anniversary122. According to Smith, the JABF has been ³DPDMRUVRXUFHRIYRWHVIRU
WKH/'3´123, and was a particularly powerful pressure group for Koizumi in his time as 
Prime Minister124.  
 
While leaders have attended on other dates, notably the Spring and Autumn festivals, 
pressure from nationalist groups is particularly strong around the 15th August 
anniversary. The ceremony is the \HDU¶Vmost prominent, and since 1998 significantly 
more Cabinet and Diet members have attended on the anniversary than at any other 
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time125. During the presidential election in 2001 Koizumi made a phone call to the 
chairwomen of the JABF asking for its support in exchange for a pledge to visit the 
shrine on the anniversary126. He faced intense pressure from China and Korea not to 
attend, and was persuaded by his aides to go two days earlier. The Japan Times said of 
WKHFKDQJH³it only serves to make many Japanese suspect that the nation's top official 
ODFNVLQWHJULW\´127, and in a survey in Japan at the time, while many approved of the 
switch, 23.3% believed that he should have attended on the anniversary, a small but 
significant number for a leader relying on the support of nationalist groups128. He later 
confessed to his constituents WRIHHOLQJµDVKDPHG¶WKDWKHKDGQRWDWWHQGHGRQWKH
anniversary itself129. When he did YLVLWRQWKHDQQLYHUVDU\LQ.RL]XPLVDLG³I 
think today is the appropriate day to go´130.  Nakasone was perturbed by the angry 
Chinese response to his visit on the anniversary in 1985, and chose not to go for the 
remainder of his tenure. His decision not to attend on the anniversary brought him 
death threats from right-wing activists131. There is no evidence that similar threats 
were made for his nonattendance on any other days of the year.  
 
While the visits have not directly led to militarized disputes, they have invariably 
strained relations with China (and Korea), in the expected action-reaction spiral of 
escalation. Since priests interred the souls of the war criminals, the Chinese response 
to official visits has consisted of media indignation, diplomatic protests, and on 
occasion, public demonstrations. When in 1985 Nakasone commemorated the 15th 
August anniversary at the shrine, the visit provoked a furious media and diplomatic 
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response in China132. One month later, thousands of Chinese university students 
protested in Beijing over the visit, sparking nationwide demonstrations to 
commemorate the 18th September anniversary. Reilly argues that these protests led to a 
more hawkish Chinese position towards Japan and increased diplomatic confrontations 
between the two countries133.  
 
China-Japan relations reached perhaps their lowest ebb in recent years following the 
election of Koizumi, who visited Yasukuni every year between 2001 and 2006. Visits 
drew official protests, led to the suspension of bilateral summit meetings134 and 
arguably contributed to the build-up in tension that culminated in intense anti-Japan 
protests against the coXQWU\¶VELGIRUUnited Nations Security Council membership in 
2005. Not all of these visits were on the anniversary however, and after the wrath from 
China and Korea in 2001, Koizumi prudently attended the shrine in other months until 
2006, when he once again attended on the 15th August. While each visit drew an angry 
response, Chinese domestic attention was higher around the anniversaries, as shown by 
figure 7, with the exception of 2005 (a time of high tension over the UNSC vote). Over 
time Chinese media have begun to pay close attention to the Japanese response in mid-
August - such as which ministers have attended and the size of the offering - 
something not done to the same extent around the other festivals135. Before Abe came 
to power, a report by Michael Green and Shinjiro Koizumi of the Center for Security 
and International Studies argued WKDW³If Abe visits Yasukuni on Aug. 15, it is certain 
that China and South Korea will close the door to talks. But, the calculation is that if 
Abe chooses another date, it provides an opportunity for China and South Korea to say 
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WKDW$EH¶VYLVLWLVQRWDVEDGDVWKDWRI.RL]XPLDQGWKH\FDQFRQYLQFHWKHLUSHRSOHWR
NHHSWKHGRRURSHQWR-DSDQ´136. While it is hard to show that visits to the shrine were 
responsible, data from the Japanese Coast Guard suggests that in August 2013 and 
2014, when Japanese ministers visited the shrine, there was a marked increase in 




in the 3HRSOH¶V'DLO\ in the thirty days following the visits. Dark blue represent 
visits around the August anniversary 
 
 
Both the Chinese and Japanese governments have dealt with these pressures 
strategically. Japanese leaders have often chosen not to attend the Yasukuni Shrine 
when particularly concerned about bilateral relations, and Chinese responses have also 
varied in their intensity depending on the international situation. Weiss argues that the 
CCP protested strongly against the Nakasone visit to Yasukuni and permitted student 
protests on the September anniversary for bargaining reasons. Protests served in part as 
an attempt to put pressure on the Japanese as part of bilateral trade negotiations, and 
Weiss reasons that Beijing made the choice to react to the shrine visit and allow 
protests on the anniversary because it had already decided to take a strong stance138.  
 
Yet strategic manipulation of the anniversary cannot be the whole story. In Japan most 
visits to the Yasukuni shrine have come despite international tensions, not because of 
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them, in an attempt to placate domestic pressure groups. Abe remained deliberately 
ambiguous about the issue on his first term in office, to avoid disrupting relations with 
China and to gain domestic support with liberal factions139, but chose to visit in his 
second term as those domestic constraints weakened, despite the lack of any obvious 
international benefits140. In 2005 Koizumi, seeking conservative support in Japan, even 
visited just days before his Foreign Minister was scheduled to meet his counterparts in 
China to strengthen Sino-Japanese cooperation141. Beijing cancelled the meetings. On 
RFFDVLRQV&KLQD¶VKDUVKUHVSRQVHWR<DVXNXQLYLVLWVKDYHDOVRJRQHDJDLQVWLWV
LQWHUQDWLRQDOSULRULWLHV.RL]XPL¶VYLVLWVWRWKHVKULQHZHUHDUJXDEO\WKHFDXVHRIWKH
poor relations between the countries from 2001142, the 1983 critical response to the 
visit came in the face of discussions around the extension of $2 billion loans from 
Japan to China143, and Abe was subject to intense private Chinese lobbying to avoid 
shrine visits when he came to office; presumably because the CCP did not want to 
continue to have the diplomatic fallouts that such visits would bring144.  
 
The Yasukuni case is an example of how concessions to domestic nationalism around 
prominent national days pushed Japanese leaders into taking actions that increased 
bilateral tensions. In this case, in contrast to my H2, those actions were not themselves 
militarized, but served to spark a reaction from China that endangered cooperation 
over bilateral disputes and raised the risk of conflict. 
 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 
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Nationalist groups and citizens in both countries have also attempted to influence 
decision makers over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. In Japan, pressure has 
often come from groups of conservative politicians, who have used various 
SURYRFDWLYHDFWLRQVWREROVWHU-DSDQ¶VFODLPV, such as landing on the islands or 
building lighthouses145. In China, Baodiao µ3URWHFWWKH'LDR\XV¶DFWLYLVWVDUHDORRVH
group of individuals who began in Taiwan in the 1970s, before spreading to Hong 
Kong and the mainland146. They seek to strengthen the mainland and Taiwanese claims 
over the islands, through public statements, protests at government offices and 
landings. Previous attempted landings on the islands have led to arrests by the 
Japanese Coast Guard and subsequent diplomatic protests (notably after a Baodiao 
activist drowned in 1996)147. 
 
These groups played important roles in 2012, where growing tensions between China 
and Japan were closely tied to the anniversaries. On the 7th July, Japanese Prime 
Minister Noda announced that his government would buy three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands from their private owner. The decision FDPHLQUHVSRQVHWR7RN\R¶VJRYHUQRU
Shintaro Ishihara (leader of the nationalist Sunrise party), who had announced in April 
his own plan to purchase the islands148. 7KHUHLVQRHYLGHQFHWKDW1RGD¶V
announcement that he would nationalize the islands was deliberately timed to take 
place on the 7th July. However Chinese media reports and social media users took 
particular exception to the fact that this day had been chosen149; seeing it as a 
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GHOLEHUDWHLQVXOWDQGHYHQH[SOLFLWO\UHIHUUHGWRLWDVD³VHFRQG0DUFR3ROR%ULGJH
LQFLGHQW´150.  While the official Chinese response was stern but muted, tensions grew 
and on the August 15th anniversary Baodiao activists landed on the disputed islands. 
The Japanese coastguard arrested the activists, before quickly deporting them.  
Publicity of the landing in China (and reciprocal landings from Japanese nationalist 
groups and politicians) led to widespread anti-Japan protests and a notable 
strengthening of CCP rhetoric.  
 
On the 11th September, Noda purchased the islands, sparking further diplomatic and 
online public protests. The Chinese government therefore faced a decision about how 
to approach the 18th September anniversary. With tensions high, there were calls 
across the country for demonstrations, and the government acquiesced, while 
attempting to keep the protests under control. According to Gries, Steiger and Wang, 
social media activity about the islands peaked at the time one might expect - around 
the purchase on the 11th of September151. The huge and often-violent countrywide 
protests did not take place until the anniversary weekend however, particularly on the 
day itself152, and Cairns and Carlson show that calls for action on Weibo peaked on 
that weekend (as they did on the 15th of August for the first wave)153. Gries and 
colleagues argue that diplomatic and military escalation was a direct result of these 
protests, and show that Chinese military actions in the East China Sea, including 
sending warships to the area, began to spike after the anniversary protests had begun, 
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increasing from the 17th of September to a peak on the 1st of October154. The Chinese 
government also cut bilateral diplomatic ties155, carried out military exercises in the 
area156, and increased patrols around the islands, as in turn did the Japan Coast 
Guard157. Over the following months the strained diplomatic relations and increased 
Chinese presence in the area led to several µFORVHFDOOV¶EHWZHHQWKHWZRPLOLWDULHV,Q
December, Japan scrambled fighter jets to meet a Chinese plane that had entered the 
LVODQGV¶DLUVSDFH158, while in the next month the Chinese navy twice locked missile 
radars onto Japanese ships159.   
 
It is difficult to show for sure whether the Chinese government manipulated the 
anniversaries in August and September to gain support for their existing decision to act 
more assertively around the islands, or if the increased presence was in part in 
UHVSRQVHWRQDWLRQDOLVWJURXSV¶DFWLRQVRQWKHVHGD\V On one hand, the only occasion 
Beijing has actively permitted mainland Baodiao activists to sail to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands was in this period, and Cairns and Carlson show that Chinese 
government censorship on Weibo DERXWµ'LDR\XLVODQGV¶GURSSHGGUDPDWLFDOO\LQWKH
middle of August, just around the first landing on the islands, suggesting that the 
Chinese government was hoping to promote bottom-up activism for its own 
purposes160. On their side Japanese leaders appeared to make efforts to calm bilateral 
tensions, despite the pressures of the 15th August anniversary. Public opinion surveys 
at the time showed that almost 70% of Japanese respondents thought the government 
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was weak in deporting rather than convicting the Baodiao landers161. So as not to 
reignite tensions after the anniversary a year later, the Japanese coastguard prevented 
activists from Ganbare Nippon from landing on the islands162. 
 
On the other hand, even authoritarian governments like China, never mind 
democracies like Japan, have sometimes been unable to stop citizen expressions of 
nationalism. On some occasions the Chinese Marine Department have been unable to 
prevent Baodiao activists, particularly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, from landing on 
the islands, such as in July 2012 when activists used a Taiwanese escort to bypass 
Chinese restrictions163. And even when China has deliberately played down tensions 
and attempted to stifle public displays of nationalism, like in 2010, the September 
anniversary still saw (albeit small) groups of anti-Japan protests throughout China164. 
Johnston, as well as Gries and colleagues, argue that in 2012, because of the sensitive 
nature of the September 18th annivHUVDU\WKHFRVWVWRWKH&&3¶VGRPHVWLFOHJLWLPDF\
of preventing the expression of nationalism were just too high165. This appears to be 
backed up by Cairns and Carlson¶VILQGLQJVthat government censorship of the dispute 
was high over the anniversary weekend. If the Communist Party was trying to promote 
protests in August, it was certainly not doing so in September166. 
 
The conclusion drawn by Gries and colleagues is that the CCP responded to the burst 
in nationalist anger in the 18th September anniversary protests by publicly escalating 
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its diplomatic and military behavior around the East China Sea167. Others have argued 
that Beijing chose to allow online nationalist sentiment and protests at these times in 
part to gain bargaining leverage in the dispute168. Whichever of these views is true, I 
argue that while the anniversary landings and protests may have come to pass in any 
case on another day, the sensitive anniversaries helped to shape when they did occur, 
and made it more difficult for the regime to crack down when they did. And while 
even these tensions did not end up sparking a full-scale conflict between the two sides, 
they meant that the risk of conflict at this time was perhaps as high as it has been in the 
region in recent years. 
 
Discussion 
It is hard to make the case for the hypothetical scenario that without war anniversaries 
between Japan and China the disputes discussed would not have occurred in any form. 
The Japanese government would still have purchased the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and 
the Chinese government would still have reacted. However this case does show that 
nationalist pressures around national anniversaries have shaped how these disputes 
have played out, particularly over the Yasukuni shrine and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, by 
providing opportunities and risks to decision-makers on either side.  
 
Domestic nationalist groups and citizens in both countries have pushed for 
memorializing activity or public protests, which Chinese leaders have at times 
undoubtedly chosen to use to bolster their existing foreign policy choices. However at 
other times both Chinese and Japanese leaders have found themselves giving in to 
domestic pressures. At the very least the anniversaries have given leaders a choice of 
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how to respond. While these pressures have not led to an outright conflict (even in 
2012), they have influenced bilateral tensions, even at times when those tensions have 
negatively affected WKHFRXQWULHV¶ international priorities. This case also supports the 
theory against two alternative arguments. Even somber anniversaries have sparked 
nationalist action, while the increase in tensions has had little to do with a greater 
likelihood of internal conflict. &KLQD¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKH<DVXNXQL6KULQHYLVLWVDOVR
demonstrates how confrontational actions from a rival state on a national day may 
provoke an even more intense reaction when that national day also celebrates past 
conflict between the two states. On the other hand, the case does not give evidence for 
my supplementary hypotheses, H2 and H3. In the Yasukuni case, it was the hostile 
Chinese reaction to anniversary visits that affected bilateral ties, while both China and 
Japan have taken actions to revise the status quo following anniversaries. 
    
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I examine whether increases in nationalism have an impact on conflict 
between states, using national days as a proxy. I have argued that states respond to 
public pressures that arise from the increased salience of the nation on national days. 
They may choose to give in to or even encourage these pressures, but on average there 
is a greater likelihood of conflict. And cross-national evidence shows that in the two 
months following a national day, states show a significant and sizeable increase in 
their number of interstate conflicts, particularly for those that initiate the conflict or 
take a revisionist stance. The confrontations around war anniversaries between China 
and Japan demonstrate that this effect is particularly strong when the current 
geopolitical rival is also the target of the national day, and while states do try and 
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manipulate the nationalism that arises at this time, they are also subject to its pressures, 
which may spark unwanted tensions.  
 
This project provides evidence that spikes in the salience of the nation do shape 
patterns of conflict between nations. Can this tell us anything however about the link 
between nationalism and conflict more broadly, or does it only apply to national days? 
Examining WKHµUHJXODU¶ occurrence of national days shines light on how any kinds of 
increases in public nationalism matter throughout the year, whether through annual 
festivals, unpredictable incidents or in the build up to a conflict. At these times 
nationalist activists respond to changes in the public sentiment and press for policies 
that in turn force a choice on decision makers and on average lead to a greater use of 
force. At the same time leaders can take advantage of these spikes in nationalism to 
take a more confrontational stance in international relations. This argument does not 
just apply to time - we might expect public nationalism to also spike in relation to 
issues or places closely linked to the nation, increasing pressures on decision-makers 
and giving greater opportunity for confrontational action over these issues169. 
     
This paper extends the finding from civil conflict that some periods in the year are 
more dangerous than others170 to international relations. In the periods following 
national days and anniversaries of conflicts, policymakers should be especially wary of 
the risk of making provocative moves or pressing territorial claims on international 
adversaries. For countries like China, initiating new official anniversaries to 
commemorate past conflicts has its own risks. Such days may help promote domestic 
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legitimacy and provide a certain amount of bargaining leverage in times of tense Sino-
Japanese relations. They may also make conflict more likely. 
 
